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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
NET INCOME AS A BASIS FOR DEDUCTIONS OF CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS.-The United States Supreme Court was recently
confronted' with the problem of whether deductions on account of
charitable contributions are to be taken from net income as defined
by Section 21,2 or from ordinary net income as defined by Section
101 (c) (7)3 of the Revenue Act of 1928.4
It appears that the taxpayer in 1928 had a net income (before
any contributions to charity) of approximately $500,000.00. Of
this, some $211,000.00 was gain from the sale of capital assets,
upon which she chose to be taxed at the rate of 12Y29o in con-
formity with Section 101 of the Revenue Act of 1928.5 In that
year the taxpayer made charitable contributions allowable as deduc-
tions in the sum of $44,000.00. The taxpayer deducted in her re-
turn the amount of the charitable contributions from her total net
income, of $500,000.00. After the deduction the taxpayer paid a
tax on $211,000.00 at the rate of 12%% and on the balance at nor-
mal and surtax rates. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue de-
termined that the taxpayer could not consider the $500,000.00 as a
base upon which to calculate the 15% deductions for charitable
contributions, but must first deduct the $211,000.00 of net gain on
sale of capital assets, and use only the balance of $289,000.00 of
1 Helvering v. Bliss; Helvering v. Harbison, 293 U. S. 144, 55 Sup. Ct.
17 (1934). These cases present the same question. The deductions claimed
and disallowed differ in amount; however, the principle involved is similar.
The statement of facts in this note is taken from the Bliss case.
2 Part II-Computation of Net Income.
Sec. 21. Net Income. "Net Income" means the gross income computed
under section 22 less the deductions allowed by section 23.
Sec. 22. Gross Income. (a) General definition. "Gross Income" includes
gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for
personal service, of whatever kind and in whatever form paid or from profes-
sions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property,
whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest
in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, security, or the transac-
tion of any business carried on for gain or profits, or gains or profits and
income derived from any source whatever. * * *
Sec. 23. Deductions from Gross Income. In computing net income there
shall be allowed as deductions: * * * (n) Charitable and Other Contributions.
In the case of an individual, contributions or gifts made within the taxable
year to or for the use of: * * * (2) any corporation, or trust, or community
chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes, * * * to an amount
which in all the above cases combined does not exceed 15 per centum of the
taxpayer's net income as computed without the benefit of this subsection. * * *
45 STAT. 797, 799, 801, 26 U. S. C. A. §§2021, 2022 (a), 2023 (n) (2).
' Subtitle C-Supplemental Provisions.
Supplement A-Rates of Tax.
Sec. 101 (c) (7). "Ordinary net income" means the net income, computed
in accordance with the provisions of this title after excluding all items of
capital gain, capital loss, and capital deductions, 45 STAT. 811, 26 U. S. C. A.
§2101.
'45 STAT. 797, 811, 26 U. S. C. A. §§2021, 2101.
545 STAT. 811, 26 U. S. C. A. §2101 (a).
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ordinary net income. As a result of this ruling there was a reduc-
tion of permissible deductions for charitable contributions to about
$40,000.00, and a consequent deficiency in tax of about $1,000.00.
The Commissioner's ruling was upheld by the Board of Tax Ap-
peal 1 but the Circuit Court of Appeals by a divided Court reversed
the Board.7 The Commissioner asserted in his appeal to the United
States Supreme Court that the basis upon which the 15% deduc-
tion for charitable contributions was to be calculated, should be
ordinary net income as defined in Section 101 (c) clause 7, that is,
as though it directed net income to be computed, "after excluding
from the computation all items of capital gain, capital loss and capi-
tal deductions." The United States Supreme Court affirmed 8 the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals and held that the taxpayer
was entitled to include capital net gain in determining the base for
the computation of the 15% deduction allowable for charitable con-
tribution, even though the taxpayer elected to be taxed on capital
net gain at the flat rate of 12Y2%.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court was logically correct
and practical. The purpose of all the Revenue Acts since that of
1916 has been to include all income of every sort including capital
gain 9 into what is termed gross income,' 0 and to allow certain de-
ductions in order to arrive at net income, which amount is to be
considered the base for the calculation of the tax." The provision
allowing a deduction for charitable contributions from gross income
to the extent of 15% of the net income computed without the bene-
fit of this deduction, was brought into the income tax law by Sec-
tion 1201 (2) of the Revenue Act of 1917.12 Its evident purpose
027 B. T. A. 205 (1932).
,68 F. (2d) 890 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). The decision of the Circuit Court
of Appeals in the case of Helvering v. Harbison, is reported in 68 F. (2d) 1004
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934). In White v. Atkins, 69 F. (2d) 960 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934)
and in Blow v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 737 (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1933) the same
result was arrived. The Board of Tax Appeals rulings were at first in con-
formity with the petitioner's contention; Elkins v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A.
572 (1931) ; Livingood v. Commissioner, 25 B. T. A. 585 (1932) ; Harbison v.
Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 896 (1932). Subsequently the full Board reached
an opposite result in Straus v. Commissioner, 27 B. T. A. 1116 (1933); see
also Robinette v. Commissioner, 27 B. T. A. 1426 (1933).
'Supra note 1.0 Supra note 1, at 146, 55 Sup. Ct. at 19.
10 "The definition of gross income given in section 22 of the Act includes
various specified classes of taxable income * * * it also includes the following
'catch all' provision. Law, Sec. 22, (a), 'Gross Income' includes * * * gains
or profits and income~derived from any source whatever." MONTGOUERY, FED-
ERAL TAX HANDBOOK (1934-1935) 85.
11 'Net Income' means the gross income computed under Sec. 22, less
the deductions allowed by Sec. 23 * * *. The law devotes one section to the
enumeration of the items included and not included in the term 'Gross Income'
Sec. 22 and another to deductions Sec. 23 and declares net income Sec. 21 to be
the remainder obtained by deducting the sums of the deductions from gross
income." Supra note 10.
" 40 STAT. 330.
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was to encourage gifts for education, charity and science. 13 It has
been included in each successive Revenue Act in substantially the
same form.'
4
With the Revenue Act of 1921, Congress for the purpose of
encouraging the taking of profits on capital assets deemed it advis-
able to relieve gain thus derived from the heavy surtaxes then ap-
plicable and to allow the payment of a tax at a flat rate of 12 .%
on the portion of the taxpayer's income representing the net gain
from such capital transactions. 15
It was thus necessary to add new provisions as to the base for
the application of two different rates. Such a division of net income
for the purpose of applying different tax rates is not novel in the
history of income tax legislation. This is evidenced by the provi-
sions affixing the rates on those portions of the entire net income
resulting from dividends, earned income, interest on obligations of
the United States and gains from the sale of mines and allowing
credit for dependents.'"
Prior to the passage of Section 101 of the Revenue Act of
1928, charitable contributions was one of the permissible deductions
of which the taxpayer could avail himself. The base on which he
computed the allowance due him for charitable deductions was net
income. To arrive at net income as defined in Section 21 17 the
taxpayer deducted items allowable under Section 22,18 from gross
income as defined under Section 23.19 The taxpayer did precisely
this in this case. 20 The arguments advanced that the capital gain
realized may not be included in net income as defined in Section 21
cannot be sustained, for the purpose of Section 101 was solely to
allow a different method for the computation of a special tax on
capital gains. In Sections 21, 22 and 23 21 of the Act of 1928 the
concept of net income is retained. Such sections are to be found
in Part 2, Title 1 of which deals with "Computation of Net Income."
As to Section 101,22 it is found under "Supplemental Provisions"
"CONG. REC. §7 (1917) 1728.
" REv. AcT OF 1934 §23 (o), 48 Stat. 688. 26 U. S. C. A. §5023; REv.
AcT OF 1932 §23 (n), 47 Stat. 179, 26 U. S. C. A. §3023; REv. ACT OF 1928 §23
(n), 45 Stat. 799, 26 U. S. C. A. §2023; REV. ACT OF 1926 §214 (a) (10), 44
Stat. 26, 26 U. S. C. A. §955; REv. ACT OF 1924 §214 (a) (10), 43 Stat. 239,
26 U. S. C. A. §95; REV. AcT OF 1921 §214 (a) (10), 42 Stat. 239; REV. ACT
OF 1918 §214 (a) (11), 40 Stat. 1066.
'1 REv. AT OF 1921 §206, 42 Stat. 232; REv. AcT OF 1924 §208, 43 Stat.
262, 26 U. S. C. A. 939 n.; REv. AcT OF 1926 §208, 44 Stat. 19, 26 U. S. C. A.
§939 n.
"See §§25, 31 and 102 of REV. ACT OF 1928, 45 Stat. 802, 804, 812, 26 U.
S. C. A. §§2025, 2031, 2102.
'







and is titled "Supplement A-Rates of Tax." It is, therefore, obvi-
ous that the only purpose of Section 101 23 was not to determine
net income, but rather a provision which allows a taxpayer to segre-
gate a particular portion of his entire net income upon which he
may compute a special rate, but in no way contravenes or challenges
what is defined as net income under Section 21.24
The position taken by the taxpayer had met with the approval
of the Board of Internal Revenue for many years.2 5 The Board
of Tax Appeals decided Elkins v. Commissioner2 6 in November,
1931, and held, contrary to the ruling of the Bureau. The Com-
missioner stated that this decision was "contrary to the position
which the Bureau had consistently followed," and would be ap-
pealed.27 But the Commissioner withdrew his determination to ap-
peal when the Board of Tax Appeal announced its decision in
Harbison v. Commissioner 28 in August, 1932, and acquiesced in
the Harbison opinion.29 The consistent administrative rulings by
the Commissioner from 1923 to 1932 during which period the pro-
visions in issue were thrice re-enacted may properly be given weight
by the Court.30 The re-enactment in later acts of the sections allow-
ing the deductions indicate Congressional satisfaction with this ad-
ministrative ruling.3 '
The Court further said, "If the meaning of the act were doubt-
ful, we should still reach the same conclusion. The exemption of
income devoted to charity and the reduction of the rate of tax on
capital gains were liberalizations of the law in the taxpayer's favor,
were begotten from motives of public policy and are not to be nar-
rowly construed. Nor should the reduction in the rate of tax on
capital gains, first granted in the Revenue Act of 1921, be held to
circumscribe the privilege granted in the earlier acts and retained
in later ones, with respect to charitable contributions, unless that
result be plainly required by the language used." 32
This enunciation is consistent with previous expressions of the
Court.33
Ibid.
' Supra note 2.
The Deputy Commissioner on February 6, 1923, telegraphed in response
to an inquiry, "Contributions; 15% limitation; capital net gain, 15% limitation
for deductions account charitable contribution applies to total net income
inclusive of gain from sale of capital assets." C. C. H. FED. INCOME TAX
SERVICE (1924) par. 2033. In 1924 a corresponding ruling as to capital losses
was made, "Capital losses cannot be excluded in computing net income for the
purpose of determining the amount of charitable contribution deductions."
I. T. 404, 111-2 Cum. BULL. 152.
'Supra note 7.
SXI-7 INT. IEV. BuL.. 5386; Min. 3931.
'Supra note 7.
'XI-49 INT. REv. BULL. 5896; Min. 3986.
' Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327, 50 Sup. Ct. 115 (1930).
' Supra note 1, at 151, 55 Sup. Ct. at 21.
nSupra note 1, at 150, 55 Sup. Ct. at 20.
Infra notes 34 and 35.
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"In the law of taxation it is frequently reiterated that 'statutes
are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear im-
port of the language used. If the words are doubtful, the
doubt must be resolved most strongly against the Govern-
ment and in favor of the citizen.' 34 Where the statute, how-
ever, contains no ambiguity it must be taken literally and given
effect according to its language.85 But the expounding of a
statutory provision strictly according to the letter without
regard to the other part of the act and legislative history,
would often defeat the object intended to be accomplished." 3 6
IRVING WEINSTEIN.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FROM TAXATION.-The prob-
lem of intergovernmental immunity from taxation is constantly assum-
ing a more important place in the law of taxation.' With mounting
deficits in national and state budgets due to tremendous relief ex-
penditures, new sources of income must be found. To meet this
need, governments have undertaken new fields of activity, such as
liquor selling,2 furnishing electric power 3 and the running of rail-
roads. 4  With both Federal and State Governments engaging in
these activities 'the question naturally arises, will each or either be
immune from taxation by the other? The answer lies, if anywhere,
in the decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject.
The roots of the problem are in the famous decision of Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland 5 decided in 1819 on
purely political grounds.6 The rule established, there being no ex-
press provision in the Constitution, 7 was that a state could not tax
the business and functions of the Bank of the United States, char-
tered by the Federal Government. The keynote of the decision was
"' Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153, 38 Sup. Ct. 53, 55 (1917) ; United
States v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179, 188, 44 Sup. Ct. 69, 71 (1923) ; Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 348, 49 Sup. Ct. 123, 125 (1929) ; Tyler v.
United States, 281 U. S. 497, 503, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (1933) ; Note (1931) 6 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 172, and cases cited therein.
'Bates Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 37, 15 Sup. Ct. 508
(1895) ; Commissioner of Immigration v. Gottleib, 265 U. S. 310, 313, 44 Sup.
Ct. 528 (1924).
INote (1934) 9 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 222.
1Note (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 326.
2 FosDICK AND Scorr, TOWARD LIQUOR CONTROL (1933).
3 THomPSON, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP (1925) 20, 204.
' Supra note 3.
'4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).04 BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919) 302.
'Supra note 5.
